(Caption of Case) Petition for Arbitration of Intebetween Time Warner Cable I (South Carolina), LLC d/b/a T Farmers Telephone Cooperati	erconnection Agreement) Information Services) Time Warner Cable and)	PUBLIC S OF S DOCKET	BEFORE THE ERVICE COMMISSION OUTH CAROLINA COVER SHEET 011 _ 243 _ C
(Please type or print) Submitted by: Margaret M.	Fox, Esquire	SC Bar Number:	65418
Submitted by. Margaret M.	1 ox, Esquire	<u> </u>	803-799-9800
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be filled out completely.	OOCKETING INFORM	MATION (Check all that	lina for the purpose of docketing and must apply) claced on Commission's Agenda
INDUSTRY (Check one)	NAT	TURE OF ACTION (Ch	eck all that apply)
Electric	Affidavit	Letter	Request
Electric/Gas	Agreement	Memorandum	Request for Certification
Electric/Telecommunications	Answer	Motion	Request for Investigation
Electric/Water	Appellate Review	Objection	Resale Agreement
Electric/Water/Telecom.	Application	Petition	Resale Amendment
Electric/Water/Sewer	Brief	Petition for Reconsi	deration Reservation Letter
Gas	Certificate	Petition for Rulemal	king Response
Railroad	Comments	Petition for Rule to Sh	ow Cause Response to Discovery
Sewer	Complaint	Petition to Intervene	Return to Petition
▼ Telecommunications	Consent Order	Petition to Intervene C	Out of Time Stipulation
Transportation	Discovery	Prefiled Testimony	Subpoena
Water	Exhibit	Promotion	Tariff
Water/Sewer	Expedited Consideration	n Proposed Order	Other:
Administrative Matter	Interconnection Agreem	nent Protest	
Other:	Interconnection Amend	ment Publisher's Affidavi	t
	Late-Filed Exhibit Print Form	Report Reset Form	

August 22, 2011

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Via Electronic Filing

Ms. Jocelyn Boyd Chief Clerk and Administrator South Carolina Public Service Commission Synergy Business Park, The Saluda Building 101 Executive Center Drive Columbia, South Carolina 29210

Re: Petition for Arbitration of Interconnection Agreement between Time Warner Cable Information Services (South Carolina), LLC, doing business as Time Warner Cable and Farmers Telephone Cooperative, Inc.; Fort Mill Telephone Company; Home Telephone Company, Inc.; and PBT Telecom, Inc.

Docket Nos. 2011-243-C; 2011-244-C; 2011-245-C; and 2011-246-C

Dear Ms. Boyd:

Enclosed for filing in the above-referenced matter, please find the Surrebuttal Testimony of Douglas Duncan Meredith. By copy of this letter and Certificate of Service all parties of record will receive a copy of this Surrebuttal Testimony via hand-delivery today.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

McNAIR LAW FIRM, P.A.

Margaretll. Fox

Margaret M. Fox

MMF:rwm Enclosure

Parties of Record cc:

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BEFORE

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF

SOUTH CAROLINA

IN RE:	Petition for Arbitration of Interconnection Agreement between Time Warner Cable Information Services (South Carolina), LLC, doing business as Time Warner Cable and Farmers Telephone Cooperative, Inc. (Docket No. 2011-243-C))) Docket No. 2011-243-C)))
IN RE:	Petition for Arbitration of Interconnection Agreement between Time Warner Cable Information Services (South Carolina), LLC, doing business as Time Warner Cable and Fort Mill Telephone Company (Docket No. 2011-244-C))) Docket No. 2011-244-C)))
IN RE:	Petition for Arbitration of Interconnection Agreement between Time Warner Cable Information Services (South Carolina), LLC, doing business as Time Warner Cable and Home Telephone Company, Inc. (Docket No. 2011-245-C))) Docket No. 2011-245-C)))
IN RE:	Petition for Arbitration of Interconnection Agreement between Time Warner Cable Information Services (South Carolina), LLC, doing business as Time Warner Cable and PBT Telecom, Inc. (Docket No. 2011-246-C))) Docket No. 2011-246-C))

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF

DOUGLAS DUNCAN MEREDITH

ON BEHALF OF

FARMERS TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE, INC.

FORT MILL TELEPHONE COMPANY

HOME TELEPHONE CO., INC.

PBT TELECOM, INC

1 Introduction

PLEASE STATE YOUR FULL NAME.

My full name is Douglas Duncan Meredith.

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Q:

A:

4	Q:	ARE YOU THE SAME MR. MEREDITH THAT TESTIFIED	
5		EARLIER IN THIS PROCEEDING?	
6	A:	Yes.	
7	Q:	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?	
8	A:	My purpose in providing this testimony to the Public Service Commission of	
9		South Carolina ("Commission" or "PSC") is to respond to the rebuttal	
10		testimony of Time Warner Cable Information Services ("Time Warner	
11		Cable").	
12		Conditional Certificate of Public Convenience and	
13		Necessity	
14	Q:	IS TIME WARNER CABLE OFFERING DIGITAL PHONE SERVICE	
15		WITHIN THE RLECS' SERVICE AREAS TODAY?	
16	A:	Yes. Time Warner Cable is offering Digital Phone service in the RLECs'	
17		service areas consistent with its conditional CPCN. Time Warner Cable is	
18		using Sprint as its underlying carrier that deals directly with the RLECs.	
19	Q:	PLEASE IDENTIFY THE ISSUE REGARDING TIME WARNER	
20	v.	CABLE'S CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND	
21		NECESSITY.	
22	A:	Time Warner Cable argues that the plain English reading of the	
23	71.	Commission's conditions placed at the time of receiving its CPCN is	
24		"absurd." It also argues that such a reading would result in Time Warner	
		3 of 13	

Cable being "locked in" with Sprint. Time Warner Cable also suggests it knows what the "Commission intended" when it limited Time Warner Cable's CPCN. Time Warner Cable argues that the condition of requiring a qualifying underlying carrier to interconnect "would deny Time Warner Cable's valid, independent rights under Section 251 to directly interconnect." Time Warner Cable argues that the condition imposed by the Commission did not restrict its ability to seek a direct interconnection with incumbent local exchange carriers.

9 Q: PLEASE IDENTIFY THE CONDITION IN THE CPCN.

10 A: In the CPCN, the Commission required:

[Time Warner Cable] shall only use underlying carriers that are authorized to do business in the State of South Carolina, that hold valid [CPCNs] issued by this Commission, and that have interconnection agreements with the RLECs.¹

Time Warner Cable's approach to this condition is to ignore it. In my Direct Testimony, I pointed out that Time Warner Cable misstated the condition by removing the last clause "and that have interconnection agreements with the RLECs." In Rebuttal testimony Time Warner Cable states the condition is only that an "interconnecting carrier hold a valid interconnection agreement ... before traffic is exchanged." Time Warner Cable's argument is wrong and is a rewrite of the Commission's order. Obviously, Time Warner Cable cannot change its underlying carrier from Sprint unless and until the new underlying carrier has interconnection agreements with the RLECs, as stated by the Commission. Otherwise, there would be a break in service.

Application of Time Warner Cable Information Services (South Carolina), LLC d/b/a Time Warner Cable to Amend Its Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Provide Telephone Services in the Service Area of Farmers Telephone Cooperative, Incorporated, et al., June 11, 2009, No. 2009-356(A) (*CPCN Order*), at 22, ordering clause number 4.

² Rebuttal Testimony of Julie P. Laine, filed August 15, 2011 in above-captioned dockets (Laine Rebuttal) at p. 3, lines 8-10.

The Commission was presented with a number of conditions that I proposed and that were proposed by ORS. As discussed in the CPCN Order,

The RLECs witnesses, Mr. Meredith and Mr. Oliver, request that the Commission grant [Time Warner Cable's] Applications but condition the amended certificate so that [Time Warner Cable] must continue using an unaffiliated non-VOIP third party CLEC, such as Sprint, for interconnection and comply with the FCC's Time Warner Declaratory Ruling and adopt other conditions set forth in more detail below.³

ORS witness, Mr. Rozyci, suggested the following conditions in response to questions from the Commissioners: (1) as long as [Time Warner Cable's] VoIP service is not designated as a "telecommunications service" by the FCC, then [Time Warner Cable] shall interconnect with the RLECs using the services of a certificated telecommunications carrier as prescribed by the FCC in its Order in WC Docket No. 06-55 [Time Warner Declaratory Ruling].4

The condition imposed in the CPCN Oder parallels the condition recommended by ORS. Time Warner Cable wants the Commission to ignore its prior discussion and determination. In the prior CPCN proceeding, I recommended that the Commission require Time Warner Cable to use Sprint until it was granted permission to change. The Commission did not require Time Warner Cable to continue to use Sprint; yet, it did require Time Warner Cable to use an underlying carrier.

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At no time in my Direct Testimony did I suggest the CPCN condition require Time Warner Cable to be "locked in" with Sprint.⁵ As a condition of its CPCN to operate in the areas served by the RLECs, the Commission requires Time Warner to use an underlying carrier of its choosing that satisfies the Time Warner Cable's attempt to directly specified requirements. interconnect by opting into the Sprint agreement is a violation of the condition.

CPCN Order at 14 (footnote omitted).

CPCN Order at 17.

Laine Rebuttal at p. 3, lines 1-4.

I recommend that the Commission reject Time Warner Cable's attempt to rewrite the condition in the *CPCN order* and mischaracterize my Direct Testimony.

Q: PLEASE COMMENT ON WHETHER TIME WARNER CABLE WAS GIVEN DIRECT INTERCONNECTION RIGHTS IN ITS CPCN.

Time Warner Cable wants the Commission to conclude that the *CPCN Order* granted Time Warner Cable the right to seek direct interconnection with incumbent carriers. The plain language of the *CPCN Order* does not support this claim. The Commission's own discussion of the condition it imposes on Time Warner Cable in the *CPCN Order* reveals yet another over-reaching of Time Warner Cable's advocacy. Specifically, the Commission said:

Time Warner [Cable] has represented to this Commission that it has no current plans to interconnect with the RLECs other than through its current wholesale arrangement [with Sprint]. Accordingly, in this Order, we address only Time Warner [Cable]'s interconnection through a wholesaler of its choosing.⁶

Time Warner Cable ignores the limited scope of the *CPCN Order* as expressed by the last sentence in the quote and the condition that comes from this discussion. This is typical. My Direct Testimony exposed other instances where Time Warner Cable conveniently ignores the context of other decisions to support its claim.

Regardless of what Time Warner Cable alleges, neither the *CPCN Order* nor the FCC's *Time Warner Declaratory Ruling*⁷ gives an interconnected VoIP Service provider the right to directly interconnect with an incumbent local exchange carrier. In the CPCN proceeding the Commission correctly found

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⁶ *CPCN Order* at 18-19, (Emphasis supplied)

Time Warner Cable Request for Declaratory Ruling that Competitive Local Exchange Carriers May Obtain Interconnection Under Section 251 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to Provide Wholesale Telecommunications Services to VoIP Providers, Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC Docket N. 06-55 (March 1, 2007) ("Time Warner Declaratory Ruling").

Time Warner Cable is an interconnected VoIP service provider and is required to use an underlying carrier who obtains interconnection with the RLECs in its own right. It should affirm this finding and deny Time Warner Cable's arbitration request.

Treatment of Time Warner Cable in the RLEC Service Areas

7 Q: TIME WARNER CABLE STATES THAT YOU ARGUE TIME 8 CABLE SHOULD BE WARNER **TREATED** DIFFERENTLY, 9 SHOULD TIME WARNER CABLE BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY?8 10 A: Yes. My Direct Testimony explains multiple reasons why Time Warner 11 Cable is to be treated differently when compared to other CLECs in the state 12 of South Carolina. Time Warner Cable's allegation that I have not identified 13 any reason why Time Warner Cable's treatment should be different is 14 incorrect.

A. Time Warner Cable Traffic

- 16 Q: DID YOU OMIT A FINDING REGARDING DIGITAL PHONE
 17 SERVICE AS ALLEGED BY TIME WARNER CABLE IN YOUR
 18 DISCUSSION OF THE CPCN ORDER?
- 19 A: No. I do not believe any material findings made by the Commission on 20 Digital Phone service were omitted. The Findings of Fact enumerated by the 21 Commission start on page 19 and end on page 21 of the CPCN Order. The 22 specific findings related to Digital Phone service and how the Commission 23 defined this service from the state and federal perspective were addressed. 24 Time Warner Cable argues that a finding about it being a provider of local 25 exchange and interexchange telecommunications services under state law is 26 dispositive. I disagree.

⁸ Laine Rebuttal at p. 6, lines 6-7.

B. Time Warner Cable Rights

2	Q:	AS A PROVIDER OF DIGITAL PHONE SERVICE, DOES TIME
3		WARNER CABLE HAVE THE RIGHT TO INTERCONNECT
4		DIRECTLY WITH THE RLECS?

A: No. Time Warner Cable's claim that the RLECs are somehow trying to "strip the Company of the statutory interconnection rights to which it is entitled by virtue of being a certificated, regulated telecommunications carrier," is flawed. The RLECs don't have to recommend stripping away rights because Time Warner Cable has never had direct interconnection rights in the RLEC service areas for its Digital Phone service. A right cannot be stripped away if it was never granted. Time Warner Cable has not provided any reliable evidence suggesting that it has a federal Section 251 interconnection right by virtue of receiving its conditional CPCN from this Commission.

15 Q: DOES THE ABILITY TO INVOKE E911 RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 16 251 PROVIDE TIME WARNER CABLE THE RIGHT TO SEEK 17 INTERCONNECTION UNDER SECTION 251?

A: No. As discussed in my Direct Testimony, a footnote in an order limited to E911 issues does not convey Section 251 interconnection rights for interconnected VoIP service providers to exchange traffic with the RLECs. Time Warner Cable's argument remains unpersuasive and should be rejected by the Commission.

⁹ *Id.* at p. 7, lines 7-9.

1	Q:	ARE SECTION 224 POLE ATTACHMENT RIGHTS DISPOSITIVE
2		OF SECTION 251 INTERCONNECTION RIGHTS?
3	A:	No. The Fiber Technology Section 224 case is distinguishable from Section
4		251 interconnection rights, especially in light of the Time Warner
5		Declaratory Order and the Commission's CPCN Order. Time Warner Cable
6		claims Section 251 rights are granted by association. As stated in my Direct
7		Testimony:
8 9 10 11 12		The Commission has not found Digital Phone service to be a federal telecommunications service – instead it has found it to be an interconnected VoIP service for federal purposes. Reliance on this case [Fiber Technology] is unavailing inasmuch as the facts are materially different.
13	Q:	DO YOU STILL CONTEND THAT "TIME WARNER CABLE HAS
14		MADE NO STATEMENTS THAT IT IS OFFERING FEDERALLY
15		DEFINED TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES AND SEEKS A
16		SECTION 251 INTERCONNECTION ARRANGEMENT WITH THE
17		ILECS FOR THIS PURPOSE?"10
18	A:	Yes. I have reviewed the response by Time Warner Cable and still affirm
19		that Digital Phone service is not a federally defined telecommunications
20		service and direct section 251 interconnection is not a right afforded
21		interconnected VoIP service providers.
22	Q:	PLEASE RESPOND TO TIME WARNER CABLE'S DISCUSSION OF
23		THE CRC DECLARATORY RULING. ¹¹
24	A:	Time Warner Cable argues that the CRC Declaratory Ruling and the Time
25		Warner Declaratory Ruling "cannot remotely be read to limit the

¹⁰ *Id.* at p. 8, line 23 to p. 9, line 3.

Petition of CRC Communications of Maine, Inc. and Time Warner Cable, Inc. for Preemption Pursuant to Section 253 of the Communications Act, as Amended, Declaratory Ruling, FCC 11-83, (rel. May 26, 2011) ("CRC Declaratory Ruling").

interconnection rights of retail telecommunications carriers."¹² This conclusion is not material to this proceeding and misdirects the Commission's attention on the central dispute in this proceeding.

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The central issue in this proceeding is that Time Warner Cable argues that its conditional CPCN in providing Digital Phone service in the RLEC service areas magically grants it rights to seek Section 251 interconnection and optinto the Sprint agreement. There are numerous flaws in this advocacy. Time Warner Cable is a certified carrier that is offering a regulated telecommunications service as defined by South Carolina Code and is an interconnected VoIP service provider as defined by Federal Code. Direct interconnection under Section 251 is not a right bestowed to interconnected VoIP service providers regardless of whether they are CLECs for state purposes. The Time Warner Declaratory Ruling established a means whereby a wholesale carrier interconnecting in its own right may provide service to interconnected VoIP service providers. Furthermore, Time Warner Cable's state rights as a CLEC are limited because the Commission has restricted and limited Time Warner Cable's CPCN with a condition requiring it is to use a qualifying underlying carrier of its choosing.

Availability of Opting Into the Sprint Agreement

- Q: TIME WARNER CABLE ARGUES THAT THE RLECS FAILED TO
 ADDRESS COST OR TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY CONCERNS IN
 THEIR ARGUMENT RELATED TO THE ABILITY TO OPT INTO
 AN INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT. DO YOU AGREE THAT
 COSTS AND/OR TECHNICAL ISSUES AFFECT §51.809(C)?
- A: No. Time Warner Cable argues that cost or technical feasibility evidence hasn't been presented and on this basis concludes the Commission should dismiss any action on the FCC's opt-in rule I cited (§51.809(c)). However,

Laine Rebuttal at p. 12, lines 11-12.

1	this critique misses the mark because the FCC rule has three subparts and the
2	timeframe provision (§51.809(c)) is independent of the cost or feasibility
3	issue (see §51.809(b)).
4 5	§ 51.809 Availability of agreements to other telecommunications carriers under section 252(i) of the Act.
6 7	(a) An incumbent LEC shall make available without unreasonable delay to any requesting telecommunications carrier any agreement in its
8	entirety to which the incumbent LEC is a party that is approved by a
9	state commission pursuant to section 252 of the Act, upon the same rates,
1	terms, and conditions as those provided in the agreement. An incumbent
1 2	LEC may not limit the availability of any agreement only to those requesting carriers serving a comparable class of subscribers or
3	providing the same serving a comparable class of subscribers of providing the same service (i.e., local, access, or interexchange) as the
4	original party to the agreement.
5	(b) The obligations of [paragraph (a)] paragraph (a) of this section
16 17	shall not apply where the incumbent LEC proves to the state commission that:
8	(1) The costs of providing a particular agreement to the requesting
9	telecommunications carrier are greater than the costs of providing it to
20	the telecommunications carrier that originally negotiated the agreement,
21	or
22	(2) The provision of a particular agreement to the requesting carrier is
23	not technically feasible.
24 25	(c) Individual agreements shall remain available for use by
	telecommunications carriers pursuant to this section for a reasonable
26	period of time after the approved agreement is available for public
27	inspection under section 252(h) of the Act. ¹³
28	Time Warner alleges that my failure to address §51.809(b) issues somehow
29	invalidates my discussion of rule §51.809(c). As I expressed in my Direct
80	Testimony, there are valid reasons why the FCC adopted §51.809(c) and
R1	these reasons are independent of cost or technical issues. Moreover Time

47 CFR § 51.809(c) (Emphasis Supplied).

Warner Cable's reference to Nextel South¹⁴ is inapt and should be rejected by the Commission because the Commission never addressed §51.809(c).

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Time Warner Cable argues that the concerns addressed by FCC rule §51.809(c) should allow any carrier to opt into any agreement at any time. 15 This argument renders the FCC discussion and rule void as it would render meaningless the words "for a reasonable period of time after the approved agreement is available for public inspection."

Harm

IS THERE A NEED TO QUANTIFY THE HARM IN GRANTING A 0: **VOIP SERVICE PROVIDER THE RIGHT TO OPT INTO SPRINT'S** INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT WITH THE RLECS?

No. I already described the possible harms in my Direct Testimony. This proceeding addresses whether Time Warner Cable has the right to opt into Sprint's Section 251 interconnection agreement with the RLECs. recommendation to the Commission is to affirm its CPCN that requires the continued use of an underlying carrier for interconnection with the RLECs. Allowing Time Warner Cable to opt into Sprint's interconnection with the RLECs would be harmful to the regulatory environment in South Carolina because of the precedent it would set and because the fact is that the Commission cannot un-ring the bell once it permits federally defined interconnected VoIP service providers to directly interconnect with incumbent carriers.

Petition for Approval of Nextel South Corporation's Adoption of the Interconnection Agreement between Sprint Communications L.P., Sprint Spectrum L.P. d/b/a Sprint PCS and BellSouth Telecommunications, Incorporated d/b/a AT&T South Carolina d/b/a AT&T Southeast, Order No. 2008-649.

Laine Rebuttal at p. 5, lines 11-18.

Furthermore, taking a step back from the whole process, it appears that what
Time Warner Cable is trying to accomplish is a modification of its CPCN in
the RLEC areas by removing a key CPCN condition – or by rendering it
meaningless. An arbitration proceeding is not the proper venue to modify a
CPCN and therefore, Time Warner Cable's request for relief in this
arbitration should be denied.

7 Q: HOW CAN TIME WARNER CABLE CONTINUE TO OFFER ITS 8 DIGITAL PHONE SERVICE IN THE RLEC SERVICE AREAS?

Time Warner Cable, a federally defined interconnected VoIP service provider, is currently providing Digital Phone service in the RLECs' service areas using Sprint as an underlying carrier. In addition, Time Warner Cable has multiple options if it wants to cancel its arrangement with Sprint. Let me describe two. First, it may use any other qualifying underlying carrier (*i.e.*, a carrier that meets the conditions imposed by the Commission in the CPCN Order). And, second, Time Warner Cable may seek a commercial arrangement with the RLECs for its interconnected VoIP services outside the parameters of a Section 251 interconnection agreement. These options are available to Time Warner Cable and are consistent with its CPCN and the proper treatment of federally defined interconnected VoIP services.

20 Q: DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR PRE-FILED SURREBUTTAL

- **TESTIMONY?**
- 22 A: Yes.

A:

BEFORE

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF

SOUTH CAROLINA

Docket Nos. 2011-243-C, 2011-244-C, 2011-245-C, and 2011-246-C

Agree Inforn doing Farme	on for Arbitration of Interconnection ement between Time Warner Cable nation Services (South Carolina), LLC, business as Time Warner Cable and ers Telephone Cooperative, Inc. tet No. 2011-243-C))))))
Agree Inform doing Fort N	on for Arbitration of Interconnection ement between Time Warner Cable nation Services (South Carolina), LLC, business as Time Warner Cable and Mill Telephone Company set No. 2011-244-C)	CERTIFICATE
Agree Inform doing Home	on for Arbitration of Interconnection ement between Time Warner Cable nation Services (South Carolina), LLC, business as Time Warner Cable and Telephone Company, Inc. tet No. 2011-245-C)	OF SERVICE)))))
Agree Inforn doing PBT T	on for Arbitration of Interconnection ement between Time Warner Cable nation Services (South Carolina), LLC, business as Time Warner Cable and relecom, Inc. tet No. 2011-246-C)	

I, Rebecca W. Martin, do hereby certify that I have this date served one (1) copy of the attached Surrebuttal Testimony of Douglas Duncan Meredith to the following parties causing said copies to be hand-delivered to the addresses as follows.

Frank R. Ellerbe, III, Esquire Bonnie D. Shealy, Esquire Robinson, McFadden & Moore 1901 Main Street, Suite 1200 Columbia, South Carolina 29201 C. Lessie Hammonds, Esquire Jeffrey M. Nelson, Esquire Office of Regulatory Staff 1401 Main Street, Suite 900 Columbia, South Carolina 29201

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August 22, 2011

Columbia, South Carolina